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Abstract 
This article proposes the ideas of stochastic resonance and noise as devices with 
which to think of the body or self as plural and porous. Boundaries and surfaces are 
proposed as indefinite; cell switching and narratives of the self are discussed in rela-
tion to external forces, via Arendt’s inter-subjectivity and La Celca’s colonization as 
infection. The sonic artwork Ghost, which uses models of spiking neurons to materi-
alize endogenous and exogenous composition in relation to noise and sonic memory 
is presented as an exploration of the boundary or limit of the notion of self. This pa-
per, which serves as a cogitatum (a force) rather than cognitio (the result), articulates 
the human body as a complex and open system that steers towards chaos by adapting 
and accepting further complexity as, and within, constantly adaptive networks of cre-
ativity. We suggest that by focusing on the porosity of boundaries and the mecha-
nisms that underlie their permeability, problems around identity and subjectivity 
might be seen in a new light. 
Keywords: boundary; cell switching; hauntings; heteropathic exchange;  
sonic memory; surface; sym⁠bio⁠gen⁠esis; transfection. 
 
This writing, produced through two disparate bodies in two distinct fields, serves as 
a cogitatum (a force) rather than cognitio (the result). This writing “between two” is 
an attempt to look at that which is captured, and that which escapes the frame. It is 
an action where “the event of performance can be said to enact the crisis of repre-
senting something fleeting and phantasmatic that persistently proliferates outside of 
its frame” (Alifuoco, 2017, p. 128). Its narrative begins from an articulation of the 
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human body as a complex and open system that steers towards chaos by adapting 
and accepting further complexity, and pervades the constantly adaptive networks of 
creativity. As in the yoked researchers generating this paper, cogno-innovative 
knowledges serve as “an endless cycle of exploration, exploitation and explanation” 
(Gummerum & Denham, 2014, p. 586) that can both cleave apart and together new 
understandings of the corporeal. 
 
Porous Boundaries of the Self, the Cell and the City 
At the level of single cells or their small clusters, our bodies are both endogenous and 
exogenous, responding both to internal and external sources, the skin the seeming 
boundary of our selves a porous envelope.  In their paper “Nature, Nurture, or 
Chance: Stochastic gene expression and its consequences” Arjun Raj and Alexander 
van Oudenaarden (Raj & Oudenaarden, 2008) present a study of cell switching in 
which small groups of cells commit a proportion of their population to stochastically 
“attune” themselves to exteriority. These groups of cells resonate with the external 
environment and become peripheral, whilst still embedded in the biological host. 
This seemingly random attribution of a portion of cells, allowing a simultaneously 
inward and outward focusing, resonates with the biological metaphor the artist and 
writer Victor Burgin offers in his essay “The City in Pieces” (Burgin, 1993/2009). The 
biological narrative he offers positions the city-scape as not only porous, but requir-
ing the subject encountering the city to become soluble, allowing for the experiencing 
of a Freudian oceanic-bliss to emerge as she becomes “at-one” with her surround-
ings. For Burgin, this shift to a more porous city is a by-product of the softening of 
political boundaries, assailed by market forces, which require a freer movement of 
capital, which he articulates as “the economic and political equivalent of ‘osmosis’—
the movement of fluid through a semi-permeable membrane, from the weaker to the 
stronger solution” (Burgin, 1993/2009, p. 236). Surely, this transformational osmo-
sis also imbues “a pathological horror of mixing” (p. 236) with fluctuating systems of 
kyriarchical implications: responding to interconnecting social structures of domi-
nation, oppression, and submission. 
The pathological horror to which Burgin refers reinforces further the biological nar-
rative as a means to understand the social, developed by Franco La Cecla’s narrative 
of infection (La Cecla, 2000) in which he counsels cautions in those moments of trav-
ersing unfamiliar territories, warning that when we travel, we are in danger of “col-
onizing with our presence every step of the journey” because “[t]o know new places 
corresponds in this century with denying their difference” (La Cecla, 2000, p. 34). We 
are borrowing here from the writings of theatre academic Nicolas Whybrow (2005), 
who positions Burgin and La Cecla in dialogue, but we offer our own development of 
his reading through the cellular understanding of the heteropathic and cannibalistic 
via the writing of Kaja Silverman (1992), who offers a further note of caution. For 
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Silverman, when the subject aims to go outside the self, which might be akin to 
Burgin’s solubility, rather than an oceanic feeling of oneness, the exchange is canni-
balistic. As newness is experienced, the subject cannot help but absorb the novelty, 
and what results is a heteropathic exchange in which the self is protected at “the ex-
pense of the other who is in effect ‘swallowed’” (Silverman, 1992, p. 205).  
 
Symbiogenesis as a Form of Haunting 
In an echo of Silverman’s process, Donna Haraway (2003) offers a kind of phantas-
matic exchange, when she imagines a ghosting of her cells by those of her dog’s: that 
some sort of exchange is occurring at the macromolecular level. She refers to this 
cell-mediation as “transfection”:  
Ms Cayenne Pepper continues to colonize all my cells—a sure case of what the biolo-
gist Lynn Margulis calls symbiogenesis. I bet if you were to check our DNA, you’d find 
some potent transfections between us. Her saliva must have the viral vectors. Surely, 
her darter-tongue kisses have been irresistible. … I’m sure our genomes are more 
alike than they should be. Some molecular record of our touch in the codes of living 
will surely leave traces in the world, no matter that we are each reproductively si-
lenced females, one by age and choice, one by surgery without consultation. Her red 
merle Australian shepherd’s quick and lithe tongue has swabbed the tissues of my 
tonsils, with all their eager immune system receptors. Who knows where my chemical 
receptors carried her messages or what she took from my cellular system for distin-
guishing self from other and binding outside to inside? (Haraway, 2003, p. 15) 
Both Haraway and Ms Cayenne Pepper’s abject kisses, and the osmotic principle out-
lined by Burgin, cause a social horror, not because of what is absorbed, but because 
the resulting admixture is foreign; the host is haunted by that which it consumes. 
Quite what, or who, is being ghosted here in any given moment, we are not fully sure, 
but we feel that the inevitable (at least) doubling that occurs in these moments results 
in more than a simple consumption: a both-and pharmakon of cellular understanding.  
These transfections unsettle the autopoietic state, which the writing of Niklas 
Luh⁠mann (1999) extends beyond biological scapes, towards non-biological systems. 
Luhmann, a sociologist interested in systems theory, describes the relationship be-
tween environment and systems thus: “[t]he environment receives its unity through 
the system and only in relation to the system . . . It is different for every system be-
cause every system excludes only itself from its environment” (Luhmann, 1999, 
p. 17). An autopoietic system reproduces itself from within itself, and is able to re-
produce and maintain itself. For Luhmann, the human agent sits outside such sys-
tems, with a focus upon the strict adherence to boundaries central to his thinking. 
And this is where the autopoietic fails as a way for us to understand systems, as its 
hermetic nature seems to preclude the messiness that we experience as human-
things carried around by a constantly mutating meat sack. Human-things occupy the 
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position of abject, where the abject refuses to “respect borders, positions, rules” ra-
ther disturbing “identity, system, order” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 4). The assumed guarded 
nature of the boundary defends against encroachment, keeps the surface intact and 
the “messiness” contained. 
 
Information Exchange as a Kind of Haunting;  
the Self Passing through the Boundaries of the Self 
Freud proposes that the skin, the seeming surface and boundary of the self, is crucial 
in understanding the construction of the psyche. This “energetic” boundary is at once 
both a physical and psychical entity with interchanging internal and external repre-
sentations. The architect Jane Rendell (2017, p. 6) quotes the philosopher Elizabeth 
Grosz: “On the one hand, the ego is on the ‘inner’ surface of the psychical agencies; 
on the other hand, it is a projection or representation of the body’s ‘outer’ surface”. 
In daily use, we tend to think of ourselves as being inviolable, with the barrier of the 
skin as sacrosanct, as something that it is broken through by accident or medical ne-
cessity. The scalpel or the graze blurring the boundaries of where the body ends and 
begins. This is an explicit moment of trauma.  
And there is an explicit moment of trauma built into this writing. This writing began 
as a presentation, and acknowledges the ghosting between its authors, but also ex-
tends this to include the haunting presence of the reader. It references what Fischer-
Lichte (2004/2008) calls the “bodily co-presence” of performer and audience (p. 38). 
It thus entertains and holds within it embodied knowledges. Dubreuil (2015) further 
describes this haunting as an “intellective space”: 
We say more than we think; we think more than we say. This does not sum up all of 
our lives, but, at least, it describes where we are now, you and me, and where we 
stand each time we reflect on something or exchange ideas and signs. This strange 
place, I call it “the intellective space,” that is, a putative space where thought and 
knowledge are performed and shared. (Dubreuil, 2015, p. 3)  
This intellective space recognizes that knowing is inseparable from the doing, and that 
all knowledges are situated and performed in social, cultural and physical contexts. 
 
Sensory Systems as Mechanisms for  
Negotiating, Rejecting and Assimilating the Self and the Other 
This intellective space creates problems for the moment where the words on the 
page are loosened from the bodies that speak them. André Lepecki (2004) problem-
atizes the theorization of performance ephemerality as “the body’s self-erasure in 
time” (p. 5). He suggests we consider how that “presence” challenges the very stabil-
ity of the body, how it can shift our cells. We can never witness ourselves at a cellular 
level, except through the mediated force of medical technologies. And as with any 
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mediated forces (see the extended debate between Phelan and Auslander in the field 
of performance studies), the mediated is always something other than the thing it-
self. It is a thing that stands in for, and arguably, in Western medical parlance, where 
new technologies increasingly replace the “touch” of the physician, it is possible to 
think of this lacuna between the cell and the self as the apotheosis of Baudrillard’s 
simulacra (Baudrillard, 1988).  
Whilst moving about the world, we are continually aware of things, beings, and objects, 
of phenomena, on vast or minuscule scales, our bodies, senses, thoughts and memories, 
focusing on, or filtering out, information. Retelling Sigmund Freud, recent neuroscien-
tific research states that it is our subconscious that shapes our experience of reality, that 
the internal and inaccessible parts of our being are the foundation for how we live in the 
world (Big Think, 2016). Our sensory systems are a dynamic mechanism for negotiat-
ing, rejecting and assimilating systems of other things at the level of movement, touch, 
taste and smell, and also at the level of cells, the body’s unconscious, epigenetic realm.  
 
Noise as the Source of Intersubjectivity 
The paper “Nature, Nurture, or Chance: Stochastic Gene Expression and Its Conse-
quences” by Arjun Raj and Alexander van Oudenaarden (2008) presents a study of 
noise, cell switching and fluctuation in single and small group studies of cells. The 
authors discuss a study in which small groups of cells commit a proportion of their 
population to stochastically anticipate the arrival of food sources. This is a neater 
way of detecting food and a viable and probable alternative to a situation in which 
cells firstly sense food directly in their environment and only then activate their met-
abolic network. The former strategy shows that “stochastic switching is a viable al-
ternative to sensing and that it is most effective when the switching rate is closely 
tuned to the rate at which the environment fluctuates” (Raj & van Oudenaarden, 
2008, p. 221), or resonates, even when this strategy sacrifices the switching group to 
“suboptimal” growth.  
This noise in the bodies of things and beings, resonating with multiple exteriors of 
the other things and beings, points to the necessity of thinking of the self as a mutable 
fluid thing, the surfaces of the self negotiable. We are already inter-subjective. 
How do we know that we are a self? Is it the narrative of time, of stories, of experi-
ences, of memory? In his novel Invisible Cities, Italo Calvino (1972) writes that in look-
ing into darkly reflective surfaces we may see ourselves, the lives that we may have 
lived, the characters we may have been, had our seemingly linear paths taken a differ-
ent route. Hannah Arendt’s inter-subjectivity places plurality at the center of selfhood, 
an inversion of subjectivity, where the inner life of the subject converses freely with 
the world, where subjectivity “is turned ‘inside out,’ like a glove, and en ⁠acts itself in 
the world. It is out there in the world and it is of the world in the fundamental sense 
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that being and appearing coincide” (Loidolt, 2014, para. 3). Here we regulate our per-
sonal relations between our internal world, our narrative and that of the external, of 
people and societies, developing a form of relationality in which we might form and 
reform concepts of the other, the alien, the imaginary and the abstract. Stories and 
narratives are where our imagination dwells, where we inhabit the inter-subjective 
place between worlds, between species, other timescales and the alien.  
To point to or to name things, beings, or objects, it is easier to think of them as discrete, 
as bounded things or beings with definitive edges. To think of things, beings or objects 
as isolated between the individual and the world, the earth and the sky; the world and 
the solar system, for example, is to neglect the complexity of relationships between 
things and the effect that each thing has on the other; the gravitational tug of Saturn’s 
rings, the gentle explosive effect of the production of hormones, the effect of the sun on 
our earth’s ionosphere. Boundaries are relational, ever changing, mutable and often 
fluid. The resolving of our internal and the external narratives are a series of ever shift-
ing boundaries. These porous and indefinite narratives or stories are a way in which 
we make sense of our world and the cosmos, of emotions, histories, futures and deaths.  
 
Nothing Is Ever Truly Discrete; Everything Bleeds into One Another 
One way to capture the ideas described in this paper is material form. The surface or 
“skin” of things or bodies are both exogenous and endogenous, an excitement of re-
lations. Encountering our “outside material world” is a subjective experience; one 
that is both closed down and opened up by language. The complexity of our experi-
ence of things, of bodies, of relations and our movement is moderated by distinctions, 
at the edges of things. The architect Juhani Pallasmaa (2005) writes: “[t]he senses 
not only mediate information for the judgement of the intellect, they are also a means 
of igniting the imagination and of articulating sensory thought” (p. 45). Pallasmaa 
regards all of the senses as an extension of touch.  
Karen Barad, the quantum physicist and feminist theorist, investigates the connec-
tion between the physical world and the world of relationships to quantum physics. 
Barad uses the term entanglements not only for matters of the quantum world but 
also to draw attention to relationships of enfolding or becoming with the “other.” She 
describes how we are bound to the other and in developing Deleuze’s différance 
writes that the relation of the self to the other is an entanglement, “a diffraction and 
dispersion of identity” (Barad, 2007, p. 9). 
Here, the very nature of matter entails an exposure to the Other: “[r]esponsibility is not 
an obligation that the subject chooses but rather an incarnate relation that precedes 
the intentionality of consciousness. Responsibility is not a calculation to be performed. 
It is a relation always already integral to the world’s ongoing intra-active becoming 
and not-becoming. It is an iterative (re)opening up to, an enabling of responsiveness. 
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Not through the realization of some existing possibility, but through the iterative re-
working of im/possibility, an on-going rupture” (Barad, 2010, p. 265). Barad also ad-
dresses the idea of intimacy and the impossibility of touch. At the center of touching 
something, or someone, is an electromagnetic interaction, it is an aversion of electrons 
within atoms, repulsion is at the core of attraction. It appears that forces, not things, 
are at the center of relations.  
 
Applying the Idea of Intersubjectivity  
as a Kind of a Haunting in a Material/Artistic Form 
In 2011, co-author Jane Grant made the artwork Ghost. At the core of the work was a 
small brain network that had been embedded with a sonic “memory,” a drone sound 
that kept the network stimulated. The work was installed in the Maksem in Taksim 
Square as part of ISEA 2011 and the Istanbul Biennial. Once installed, live sounds 
picked up by microphones outside of the building in the busy Taksim Square stimu-
lated artificial spiking neurons modeled in the computer to “fire,” sending small frag-
ments of sound to the eight speakers inside the building. If the external sounds fail 
to reach a particular threshold, the “memory embedded” sounds begin to be heard. 
Over time, the external sounds start to embed themselves into the model, gathering 
sensory information and sonifying both the past and the present, a form of cortical 
haunting. In space the microphones picked up the sounds of traffic, sirens and the 
Adhan from a nearby mosque. The sounds became fragmented, reconfigured, over-
lapping, a sonification of neurons firing with external and endogenous patterns and 
rhythms, sonic ghosts, merging the neural past with the neural present. 
 
Figure 1. Grant, J. Ghost, ISEA Istanbul, Istanbul Biennial, 2011. 
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If bodies are haunted, attuned to exteriority and mutability, and as Franco La Cecla 
(2000) writes, “we are molded by light, walls, mountains, and cities and learn how to 
mold ourselves in new landscapes and streets” (p. 30), how might we get lost within 
our own bodies, to rediscover their materiality? Grant’s Ghost might then serve as an 
act of physical and theoretical palpation to explore the intellective space between the 
researcher-performers and audience, to acknowledge transdisciplinary narratives 
and begin to ask how we might open up the body as a site, one that can be understood 
as agentic, but not preeminent, within any given system of exchange.  
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Response to “Haunted Bodies: Cell Switching, Getting Lost and Adaptive Geog-
raphies” by Diego S. Maranan 
 
Who am I, and what does it mean to be me given that I am also ever-changing? Con-
fronting this dilemma, Denham and Punt (2017) suggest a process—the cognitive in-
novation function—in which being and becoming human are integrated into a unified 
explanatory framework. However, the underlying processes that contribute to the 
function are left for the reader to fill in. In Grant and Whalley’s paper, one such process 
is suggested, organized around the role that boundaries play in mediating the (inter-
nal) self and the (exterior) other. A boundary defines that thing that it bounds. The 
skin, for instance, physically marks the extent of an individual; a city’s borders not 
only circumscribe but define the city. However, the boundary is also a site of negotia-
tion—for entries and exits, for information exchange, for movement. Negotiation at 
boundaries (this paper could be seen to suggest) is one of the processes underlying 
the cognitive innovation process. (Perhaps it is in this sense that the authors mobilize 
the concept of performance, though the discussion around this could be developed 
further, or parked for another discussion altogether.) Inspired by biology, the paper 
cites processes in living organisms that render boundaries temporary and porous: cell 
switching, osmosis, infection, and (to a lesser extent) autopoiesis. The authors then 
discuss examples in which biological processes might be seen to figure: cities, perfor-
mance, relationships, art, architecture, cosmology. As an explanatory tool, metaphors 
are powerful but tricky: using processes occurring on the scale of cells as a metaphor 
for what might happen on the scale of human individuals or societies carries risk. For 
one, there is scale fallacy; the processes at play at one scale may not play a significant 
role in another (although properties and behaviors that operate on a smaller scale 
often create properties and behaviors that operate and are observable on a larger 
scale). Quantum effects are an example. However—and this is important to stress for 
the interdisciplinary audience of Off the Lip—this paper does not intend to propose 
an explanatory framework. Instead, what it offers is an invitation to reflect on what 
kinds of process happen in the boundary of living systems that might be able to ac-
count for the kinds of change that lead to the changes in the phenomena world, and to 
what extent these processes might be present, fractal-like, across scales.  
A related concept to negotiation at boundaries is that of touch. The authors cite 
Palas⁠maa, with the idea that all of the senses are an extension of touch. It is worth 
noting that a precedent for this assertion is Rudolf von Laban (see Schiphorst, 2008, 
p. 195). Touch involves two boundaries coming into contact into each other and po-
tentially transforming if not the boundary themselves, then that which the boundary 
bounds. In my research at CogNovo, and drawing on Shusterman’s philosophy of som-
aesthetics, I highlighted the role that the act of touching a surface (and attending to 
the contact that one’s body makes with the surface) contributes to knowledge not only 
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about this exterior surface, but also to the state of one own’s body. For example, I ar-
gued that a flat, horizontal, sufficiently springy surface allows one to make systematic 
comparisons of their proprioceptive and kinesthetic experiences while walking, stand-
ing, or lying down. Here, boundaries (the surfaces of the skin and of the environment) 
also instigate changes in the organism’s perception of themselves. The literature on the 
theoretical dimensions of touch is substantial, but perhaps there is a gap in theorizing 
of the role that touch—in the sense of two surfaces in contact and in negotiation with 
each other—has in the evolution of cognitive systems across multiple scales. 
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